

ISP Network Design



ISP Workshops



ISP Network Design

- ❑ PoP Topologies and Design
- ❑ Backbone Design
- ❑ Upstream Connectivity & Peering
- ❑ Addressing
- ❑ Routing Protocols
- ❑ Security
- ❑ Out of Band Management
- ❑ Operational Considerations

Point of Presence Topologies



PoP Topologies


- ❑ Core routers – high speed trunk connections
- ❑ Distribution routers and Access routers – high port density
- ❑ Border routers – connections to other providers
- ❑ Service routers – hosting and servers
- ❑ Some functions might be handled by a single router



PoP Design

- ❑ Modular Design
- ❑ Aggregation Services separated according to
 - connection speed
 - customer service
 - contention ratio
 - security considerations

Modular PoP Design



Modular Routing Protocol Design

- ❑ Modular IGP implementation
 - IGP “area” per PoP
 - Core routers in backbone area (Area 0/L2)
 - Aggregation/summarisation where possible into the core
- ❑ Modular iBGP implementation
 - BGP route reflector cluster
 - Core routers are the route-reflectors
 - Remaining routers are clients & peer with route-reflectors only

Point of Presence Design



PoP Modules

- ❑ Low Speed customer connections
 - ADSL2, Cable, Public Wireless, PSTN access
 - Low bandwidth needs
 - Low revenue, large numbers
- ❑ Business customer connections
 - 10Mbps to 100Mbps speed range
 - Delivery over SDH or MetroEthernet links
 - Medium bandwidth needs
 - Medium revenue, medium numbers



PoP Modules

- Highband Business customer connections
 - From 100Mbps to over 1Gbps
 - Ethernet, Fibre, or high end SDH
 - High bandwidth needs
 - High revenue, low numbers

PoP Modules

□ PoP Core

- Two dedicated routers
- High Speed interconnect
- Backbone Links **ONLY**
- *Do not touch them!*

□ Border Network

- Dedicated border router to other ISPs
- The ISP's "front" door
- Transparent web caching?
- **Two** in backbone is minimum guarantee for redundancy

PoP Modules

□ ISP Services

- DNS (cache, secondary)
- News (still relevant?)
- Mail (POP3, Relay, Anti-virus/anti-spam)
- WWW (server, proxy, cache)


□ Hosted Services/DataCentres

- Virtual Web, WWW (server, proxy, cache)
- Information/Content Services
- Electronic Commerce


PoP Modules

- Network Operations Centre
 - Consider primary and backup locations
 - Network monitoring
 - Statistics and log gathering
 - Direct but secure access
- Out of Band Management Network
 - The ISP Network “Safety Belt”


PSTN & Broadband Access Module




Business Customer Access Module




High Speed Access Module




ISP Services Module




Hosted Services Module




Border Module



NOC Module



Out of Band Network



Backbone Network Design




Backbone Design

- Routed Backbone
- Switched Backbone
 - ATM/Frame Relay core network
 - Now obsolete
- Point-to-point circuits
 - nx64K, T1/E1, T3/E3, OC3, OC12, GigE, OC48, 10GigE, OC192, OC768, 100GE
- ATM/Frame Relay service from telco
 - T3, OC3, OC12,... delivery
 - Easily upgradeable bandwidth (CIR)
 - Almost vanished in availability now

Distributed Network Design

- ❑ PoP design “standardised”
 - operational scalability and simplicity
- ❑ ISP essential services distributed around backbone
- ❑ NOC and “backup” NOC
- ❑ Redundant backbone links

Distributed Network Design



Backbone Links

□ ATM/Frame Relay

- Virtually disappeared due to overhead, extra equipment, and shared with other customers of the telco
- MPLS has replaced ATM & FR as the telco favourite

□ Leased Line/Circuit

- Most popular with backbone providers
- IP over Optics and Metro Ethernet very common in many parts of the world


Long Distance Backbone Links

- These usually cost more
- Important to plan for the future
 - This means at least two years ahead
 - Stay in budget, stay realistic
 - Unplanned “emergency” upgrades will be disruptive without redundancy in the network infrastructure

Long Distance Backbone Links

- Allow sufficient capacity on alternative paths for failure situations
 - Sufficient can depend on the business strategy
 - Sufficient can be as little as 20%
 - Sufficient is usually over 50% as this offers “business continuity” for customers in the case of link failure
 - Some businesses choose 0%
 - Very short sighted, meaning they have no spare capacity at all!!

Long Distance Links






Metropolitan Area Backbone Links

- Tend to be cheaper
 - Circuit concentration
 - Choose from multiple suppliers
- Think big
 - More redundancy
 - Less impact of upgrades
 - Less impact of failures

Metropolitan Area Backbone Links



Traditional Point to Point Links

Upstream Connectivity and Peering



Transits

- ❑ Transit provider is another autonomous system which is used to provide the local network with access to other networks
 - Might be local or regional only
 - But more usually the whole Internet
- ❑ Transit providers need to be chosen wisely:
 - Only one
 - ❑ no redundancy
 - Too many
 - ❑ more difficult to load balance
 - ❑ no economy of scale (costs more per Mbps)
 - ❑ hard to provide service quality
- ❑ **Recommendation: at least two, no more than three**

Common Mistakes

- ❑ ISPs sign up with too many transit providers
 - Lots of small circuits (cost more per Mbps than larger ones)
 - Transit rates per Mbps reduce with increasing transit bandwidth purchased
 - Hard to implement reliable traffic engineering that doesn't need daily fine tuning depending on customer activities
- ❑ No diversity
 - Chosen transit providers all reached over same satellite or same submarine cable
 - Chosen transit providers have poor onward transit and peering

Peers

- ❑ A peer is another autonomous system with which the local network has agreed to exchange locally sourced routes and traffic
- ❑ Private peer
 - Private link between two providers for the purpose of interconnecting
- ❑ Public peer
 - Internet Exchange Point, where providers meet and freely decide who they will interconnect with
- ❑ **Recommendation: peer as much as possible!**


Common Mistakes

- ❑ Mistaking a transit provider's "Exchange" business for a no-cost public peering point
- ❑ Not working hard to get as much peering as possible
 - Physically near a peering point (IXP) but not present at it
 - (Transit sometimes is cheaper than peering!!)
- ❑ Ignoring/avoiding competitors because they are competition
 - Even though potentially valuable peering partner to give customers a better experience

Private Interconnection

- Two service providers agree to interconnect their networks
 - They exchange prefixes they originate into the routing system (usually their aggregated address blocks)
 - They share the cost of the infrastructure to interconnect
 - Typically each paying half the cost of the link (be it circuit, satellite, microwave, fibre,...)
 - Connected to their respective peering routers
 - Peering routers only carry domestic prefixes

Private Interconnection




- ❑ PR = peering router
 - Runs iBGP (internal) and eBGP (with peer)
 - No default route
 - No "full BGP table"
 - Domestic prefixes only
- ❑ Peering router used for all private interconnects³⁸

Public Interconnection

- ❑ Service provider participates in an Internet Exchange Point
 - It exchanges prefixes it originates into the routing system with the participants of the IXP
 - It chooses who to peer with at the IXP
 - ❑ Bi-lateral peering (like private interconnect)
 - ❑ Multi-lateral peering (via IXP's route server)
 - It provides the router at the IXP and provides the connectivity from their PoP to the IXP
 - The IXP router carries only domestic prefixes

Public Interconnection




- ❑ ISP1-PR = peering router of our ISP
 - Runs iBGP (internal) and eBGP (with IXP peers)
 - No default route
 - No “full BGP table”
 - Domestic prefixes only
- ❑ Physically located at the IXP

Public Interconnection

- ❑ The ISP's router IXP peering router needs careful configuration:
 - It is remote from the domestic backbone
 - Should not originate any domestic prefixes
 - (As well as no default route, no full BGP table)
 - Filtering of BGP announcements from IXP peers (in and out)
- ❑ Provision of a second link to the IXP:
 - (for redundancy or extra capacity)
 - Usually means installing a second router
 - ❑ Connected to a second switch (if the IXP has two more more switches)
 - ❑ Interconnected with the original router (and part of iBGP mesh)

Public Interconnection




- ❑ Provision of a second link to the IXP means considering redundancy in the SP's backbone
 - Two routers
 - Two independent links
 - Separate switches (if IXP has two or more switches)

Upstream/Transit Connection


- Two scenarios:
 - Transit provider is in the locality
 - Which means bandwidth is cheap, plentiful, easy to provision, and easily upgraded
 - Transit provider is a long distance away
 - Over undersea cable, satellite, long-haul cross country fibre, etc
- Each scenario has different considerations which need to be accounted for

Local Transit Provider



- ❑ BR = ISP's Border Router
 - Runs iBGP (internal) and eBGP (with transit)
 - Either receives default route or the full BGP table from upstream
 - BGP policies are implemented here (depending on connectivity)
 - Packet filtering is implemented here (as required)

Distant Transit Provider



- ❑ BR = ISP's Border Router
 - Co-located in a co-lo centre (typical) or in the upstream provider's premises
 - Runs iBGP with rest of ISP1 backbone
 - Runs eBGP with transit provider router(s)
 - Implements BGP policies, packet filtering, etc
 - Does not originate any domestic prefixes


Distant Transit Provider

- ❑ Positioning a router close to the Transit Provider's infrastructure is strongly encouraged:
 - Long haul circuits are expensive, so the router allows the ISP to implement appropriate filtering first
 - Moves the buffering problem away from the Transit provider
 - Remote co-lo allows the ISP to choose another transit provider and migrate connections with minimum downtime

Distant Transit Provider

- ❑ Other points to consider:
 - Does require remote hands support
 - (Remote hands would plug or unplug cables, power cycle equipment, replace equipment, etc as instructed)
 - Appropriate support contract from equipment vendor(s)
 - Sensible to consider two routers and two long-haul links for redundancy

Distant Transit Provider



- ❑ Upgrade scenario:
 - Provision two routers
 - Two independent circuits
 - Consider second transit provider and/or turning up at an IXP

Summary

- Design considerations for:
 - Private interconnects
 - Simple private peering
 - Public interconnects
 - Router co-lo at an IXP
 - Local transit provider
 - Simple upstream interconnect
 - Long distance transit provider
 - Router remote co-lo at datacentre or Transit premises

Upstream Connectivity and Peering Case Study



How Seacom chose their
international peering locations
and transit providers



Objective

- ❑ Obtain high grade Internet connectivity for the wholesale market in Africa to the rest of the world
- ❑ Emphasis on:
 - Reliability
 - Interconnectivity density
 - Scalability

Metrics Needed in Determining Solution (1)

- ❑ Focusing on operators that cover the destinations mostly required by Africa
 - i.e., English-speaking (Europe, North America)
- ❑ Include providers with good connectivity into South America and the Asia Pacific.
- ❑ Little need for providers who are strong in the Middle East, as demand from Africa for those regions is very, very low.

Metrics Needed in Determining Solution (2)

- ❑ Split the operators between Marseille (where the SEACOM cable lands) and London (where there is good Internet density)
 - To avoid outages due to backhaul failure across Europe
 - And still maintain good access to the Internet
- ❑ Look at providers who are of similar size so as not to fidget too much (or at all) with BGP tuning.
- ❑ The providers needed to support:
 - 10Gbps ports
 - Bursting bandwidth/billing
 - Future support for 100Gbps or $N \times 10\text{Gbps}$

Metrics Needed in Determining Solution (3)

- ❑ Implement peering at major exchange points in Europe
 - To off-set long term operating costs re: upstream providers.

Implementing Solution

- ❑ Connected to Level(3) and GT-T (formerly Inteliquent, formerly Tinet) in Marseille
- ❑ Connected to NTT and TeliaSonera in London
- ❑ Peered in London (LINX)
- ❑ Peered in Amsterdam (AMS-IX)
- ❑ BGP setup to prefer traffic being exchanged at LINX and AMS-IX
- ❑ BGP setup to prefer traffic over the upstreams that we could not peer away
- ❑ No additional tuning done on either peered or transit traffic, i.e., no prepending, no de-aggregation, etc. All traffic setup to flow naturally

End Result

- ❑ 50% of traffic peered away in less than 2x months of peering at LINX and AMS-IX
- ❑ 50% of traffic handled by upstream providers
- ❑ Equal traffic being handled by Level(3) and GT-T in Marseille
- ❑ Equal traffic being handled by TeliaSonera and NTT in London
- ❑ Traffic distribution ratios across all the transit providers is some 1:1:0.9:0.9
- ❑ This has been steady state for the last 12x months
 - No BGP tuning has been done at all

Addressing



Where to get IP addresses and AS numbers

- ❑ Your upstream ISP
- ❑ Africa
 - AfriNIC – <http://www.afrinic.net>
- ❑ Asia and the Pacific
 - APNIC – <http://www.apnic.net>
- ❑ North America
 - ARIN – <http://www.arin.net>
- ❑ Latin America and the Caribbean
 - LACNIC – <http://www.lacnic.net>
- ❑ Europe and Middle East
 - RIPE NCC – <http://www.ripe.net/info/ncc>

Internet Registry Regions



Getting IP address space

- ❑ Take part of upstream ISP's PA space
- or
- ❑ Become a member of your Regional Internet Registry and get your own allocation
 - Require a plan for a year ahead
 - General policies are outlined in RFC2050, more specific details are on the individual RIR website
- ❑ There is no more IPv4 address space at IANA
 - APNIC and RIPE NCC are now in their “final /8” IPv4 delegation policy phase
 - Limited IPv4 available
 - IPv6 allocations are simple to get in most RIR regions

What about RFC1918 addressing?

- ❑ RFC1918 defines IPv4 addresses reserved for private Internets
 - Not to be used on Internet backbones
 - <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1918.txt>
- ❑ Commonly used within end-user networks
 - NAT used to translate from private internal to public external addressing
 - Allows the end-user network to migrate ISPs without a major internal renumbering exercise
- ❑ ISPs must filter RFC1918 addressing at their network edge
 - <http://www.cymru.com/Documents/bogon-list.html>

What about RFC1918 addressing?

- ❑ There is a long list of well known problems:
 - <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6752.txt>
- ❑ Including:
 - False belief it conserves address space
 - Adverse effects on Traceroute
 - Effects on Path MTU Discovery
 - Unexpected interactions with some NAT implementations
 - Interactions with edge anti-spoofing techniques
 - Peering using loopbacks
 - Adverse DNS Interaction
 - Serious Operational and Troubleshooting issues
 - Security Issues
 - ❑ false sense of security, defeating existing security techniques

Private versus Globally Routable IP Addressing

- ❑ Infrastructure Security: not improved by using private addressing
 - Still can be attacked from inside, or from customers, or by reflection techniques from the outside
- ❑ Troubleshooting: made an order of magnitude harder
 - No Internet view from routers
 - Other ISPs cannot distinguish between down and broken
- ❑ Summary:
 - **ALWAYS use globally routable IP addressing for ISP Infrastructure**

Addressing Plans – ISP Infrastructure


- ❑ Address block for router loop-back interfaces
- ❑ Address block for infrastructure
 - Per PoP or whole backbone
 - Summarise between sites if it makes sense
 - Allocate according to genuine requirements, not historic classful boundaries
- ❑ Similar allocation policies should be used for IPv6 as well
 - ISPs just get a substantially larger block (relatively) so assignments within the backbone are easier to make

Addressing Plans – Customer


- ❑ Customers are assigned address space according to need
- ❑ Should not be reserved or assigned on a per PoP basis
 - ISP iBGP carries customer nets
 - Aggregation not required and usually not desirable

Addressing Plans – ISP Infrastructure

□ Phase One



□ Phase Two



Addressing Plans

Planning

- ❑ Registries will usually allocate the next block to be contiguous with the first allocation
 - Minimum allocation could be /21
 - Very likely that subsequent allocation will make this up to a /20
 - So plan accordingly

Addressing Plans (contd)

- ❑ Document infrastructure allocation
 - Eases operation, debugging and management
- ❑ Document customer allocation
 - Contained in iBGP
 - Eases operation, debugging and management
 - Submit network object to RIR Database

Routing Protocols



Routing Protocols

- ❑ IGP – Interior Gateway Protocol
 - Carries infrastructure addresses, point-to-point links
 - Examples are OSPF, ISIS,...
- ❑ EGP – Exterior Gateway Protocol
 - Carries customer prefixes and Internet routes
 - Current EGP is BGP version 4
- ❑ No connection between IGP and EGP

Why Do We Need an IGP?

- ISP backbone scaling
 - Hierarchy
 - Modular infrastructure construction
 - Limiting scope of failure
 - Healing of infrastructure faults using dynamic routing with fast convergence

Why Do We Need an EGP?

- Scaling to large network
 - Hierarchy
 - Limit scope of failure
- Policy
 - Control reachability to prefixes
 - Merge separate organizations
 - Connect multiple IGPs

Interior versus Exterior Routing Protocols

□ Interior

- Automatic neighbour discovery
- Generally trust your IGP routers
- Prefixes go to all IGP routers
- Binds routers in one AS together

□ Exterior

- Specifically configured peers
- Connecting with outside networks
- Set administrative boundaries
- Binds AS's together

Interior versus Exterior Routing Protocols


□ Interior

- Carries ISP infrastructure addresses only
- ISPs aim to keep the IGP small for efficiency and scalability

□ Exterior

- Carries customer prefixes
- Carries Internet prefixes
- EGPs are independent of ISP network topology

Hierarchy of Routing Protocols



Routing Protocols:

Choosing an IGP

- ❑ OSPF and ISIS have very similar properties
 - Review the “ISIS vs OSPF” presentation
- ❑ Which to choose?
 - Choose which is appropriate for your operators’ experience
 - In most vendor releases, both OSPF and ISIS have sufficient “nerd knobs” to tweak the IGP’s behaviour
 - OSPF runs on IP
 - ISIS runs on infrastructure, alongside IP
 - ISIS supports both IPv4 and IPv6
 - OSPFv2 (IPv4) plus OSPFv3 (IPv6)

Routing Protocols:

IGP Recommendations

- ❑ Keep the IGP routing table as small as possible
 - If you can count the routers and the point-to-point links in the backbone, that total is the number of IGP entries you should see
- ❑ IGP details:
 - Should only have router loopbacks, backbone WAN point-to-point link addresses, and network addresses of any LANs having an IGP running on them
 - Strongly recommended to use inter-router authentication
 - Use inter-area summarisation if possible

Routing Protocols:

More IGP recommendations

- ❑ To fine tune IGP table size more, consider:
 - Using “ip unnumbered” on customer point-to-point links – saves carrying that /30 in IGP
 - ❑ (If customer point-to-point /30 is required for monitoring purposes, then put this in iBGP)
 - Use contiguous addresses for backbone WAN links in each area – then summarise into backbone area
 - Don't summarise router loopback addresses – as iBGP needs those (for next-hop)
 - Use iBGP for carrying anything which does not contribute to the IGP Routing process

Routing Protocols:

iBGP Recommendations

- ❑ iBGP should carry everything which doesn't contribute to the IGP routing process
 - Internet routing table
 - Customer assigned addresses
 - Customer point-to-point links
 - Access network dynamic address pools, passive LANs, etc

Routing Protocols:

More iBGP Recommendations

- ❑ Scalable iBGP features:
 - Use neighbour authentication
 - Use peer-groups to speed update process and for configuration efficiency
 - Use communities for ease of filtering
 - Use route-reflector hierarchy
 - ❑ Route reflector pair per PoP (overlaid clusters)

Security



Security

- ❑ ISP Infrastructure security
- ❑ ISP Network security
- ❑ Security is **not optional!**
- ❑ ISPs need to:
 - Protect themselves
 - Help protect their customers from the Internet
 - Protect the Internet from their customers
- ❑ The following slides are general recommendations
 - Do more research on security before deploying any network

ISP Infrastructure Security

❑ Router & Switch Security

- Use Secure Shell (SSH) for device access & management
 - ❑ Do NOT use Telnet
- Device management access filters should only allow NOC and device-to-device access
 - ❑ Do NOT allow external access
- Use TACACS+ for user authentication and authorisation
 - ❑ Do NOT create user accounts on routers/switches

ISP Infrastructure Security

□ Remote access

- For Operations Engineers who need access while not in the NOC
- Create an SSH server host (this is all it does)
 - Or a Secure VPN access server
- Ops Engineers connect here, and then they can access the NOC and network devices

ISP Infrastructure Security

- ❑ Other network devices?
 - These probably do not have sophisticated security techniques like routers or switches do
 - Protect them at the LAN or point-to-point ingress (on router)
- ❑ Servers and Services?
 - Protect servers on the LAN interface on the router
 - Consider using iptables &c on the servers too
- ❑ SNMP
 - Apply access-list to the SNMP ports
 - Should only be accessible by management system, not the world

ISP Infrastructure Security

□ General Advice:

- Routers, Switches and other network devices should not be contactable from outside the AS
- Achieved by blocking typical management access protocols for the infrastructure address block at the network perimeter
 - E.g. ssh, telnet, http, snmp,...
- Use the ICSI Netalyser to check access levels:
 - <http://netalyzr.icsi.berkeley.edu>
- **Don't block everything: BGP, traceroute and ICMP still need to work!**

ISP Network Security

□ Effective filtering

- Protect network borders from “traffic which should not be on the public Internet”, for example:
 - LAN protocols (eg netbios)
 - Well known exploit ports (used by worms and viruses)
 - Drop traffic arriving and going to private and non-routable address space (IPv4 and IPv6)
- Achieved by packet filters on border routers
 - Remote trigger blackhole filtering

ISP Network Security – RTBF

- ❑ Remote trigger blackhole filtering
 - ISP NOC injects prefixes which should not be accessible across the AS into the iBGP
 - Prefixes have next hop pointing to a blackhole address
 - All iBGP speaking backbone routers configured to point the blackhole address to the null interface
 - Traffic destined to these blackhole prefixes are dropped by the first router they reach
- ❑ Application:
 - Any prefixes (including RFC1918) which should not have routability across the ISP backbone

ISP Network Security – RTBF

❑ Remote trigger blackhole filtering example:

■ Origin router:

```
router bgp 64509
  redistribute static route-map black-hole-trigger
  !
ip route 10.5.1.3 255.255.255.255 Null0 tag 66
  !
route-map black-hole-trigger permit 10
  match tag 66
  set local-preference 1000
  set community no-export
  set ip next-hop 192.0.2.1
  !
```

■ iBGP speaking backbone router:

```
ip route 192.0.2.1 255.255.255.255 null0
```

ISP Network Security – RTBF

□ Resulting routing table entries:

```
gw1#sh ip bgp 10.5.1.3
```

```
BGP routing table entry for 10.5.1.3/32, version 64572219
```

```
Paths: (1 available, best #1, table Default-IP-Routing-Table)
```

```
Not advertised to any peer
```

```
Local
```

```
192.0.2.1 from 1.1.10.10 (1.1.10.10)
```

```
Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 1000, valid, internal, best
```

```
Community: no-export
```

```
gw1#sh ip route 10.5.1.3
```

```
Routing entry for 10.5.1.3/32
```

```
Known via "bgp 64509", distance 200, metric 0, type internal
```

```
Last update from 192.0.2.1 00:04:52 ago
```

```
Routing Descriptor Blocks:
```

```
* 192.0.2.1, from 1.1.10.10, 00:04:52 ago
```


```
Route metric is 0, traffic share count is 1
```

```
AS Hops 0
```

ISP Network Security – uRPF

- ❑ Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding
- ❑ Strongly recommended to be used on all customer facing **static** interfaces
 - BCP 38 (tools.ietf.org/html/bcp38)
 - **Blocks all unroutable source addresses the customer may be using**
 - Inexpensive way of filtering customer's connection (when compared with packet filters)
- ❑ Can be used for multihomed connections too, but extreme care required

What is uRPF?



- ❑ Router compares source address of incoming packet with FIB entry
 - If FIB entry interface matches incoming interface, the packet is forwarded
 - If FIB entry interface does not match incoming interface, the packet is dropped

Security Summary

- ❑ Implement RTBF
 - Inside ISP backbone
 - Make it available to BGP customers too
 - ❑ They can send you the prefix you need to block with a special community attached
 - ❑ You match on that community, and set the next-hop to the null address
- ❑ Implement uRPF
 - For all static customers
- ❑ Use SSH for device access
- ❑ Use TACACS+ for authentication

Out of Band Management



Out of Band Management

- ❑ **Not optional!**
- ❑ Allows access to network equipment in times of failure
- ❑ Ensures quality of service to customers
 - Minimises downtime
 - Minimises repair time
 - Eases diagnostics and debugging

Out of Band Management

- ❑ OoB Example – Access server:
 - modem attached to allow NOC dial in
 - console ports of all network equipment connected to serial ports
 - LAN and/or WAN link connects to network core, or via separate management link to NOC
- ❑ Full remote control access under all circumstances



Out of Band Management

- ❑ OoB Example – Statistics gathering:
 - Routers are NetFlow and syslog enabled
 - Management data is congestion/failure sensitive
 - Ensures management data integrity in case of failure
- ❑ Full remote information under all circumstances

Test Laboratory



Test Laboratory

- ❑ Designed to look like a typical PoP
 - Operated like a typical PoP
- ❑ Used to trial new services or new software under realistic conditions
- ❑ Allows discovery and fixing of potential problems before they are introduced to the network

Test Laboratory

- ❑ Some ISPs dedicate equipment to the lab
- ❑ Other ISPs “purchase ahead” so that today’s lab equipment becomes tomorrow’s PoP equipment
- ❑ Other ISPs use lab equipment for “hot spares” in the event of hardware failure

Test Laboratory

- ❑ Can't afford a test lab?
 - Set aside one spare router and server to trial new services
 - Never ever try out new hardware, software or services on the live network
- ❑ Every major ISP in the US and Europe has a test lab
 - It's a serious consideration

Operational Considerations





Operational Considerations

Why design the world's best network when you have not thought about what operational good practices should be implemented?

Operational Considerations

Maintenance

- ❑ Never work on the live network, no matter how trivial the modification may seem
 - Establish maintenance periods which your customers are aware of
 - ❑ e.g. Tuesday 4-7am, Thursday 4-7am
- ❑ Never do maintenance on the last working day before the weekend
 - Unless you want to work all weekend cleaning up
- ❑ Never do maintenance on the first working day after the weekend
 - Unless you want to work all weekend preparing

Operational Considerations

Support

- ❑ Differentiate between customer support and the Network Operations Centre
 - Customer support fixes customer problems
 - NOC deals with and fixes backbone and Internet related problems
- ❑ Network Engineering team is last resort
 - They design the next generation network, improve the routing design, implement new services, etc
 - They do not and should not be doing support!

Operational Considerations

NOC Communications

- ❑ NOC should know contact details for equivalent NOCs in upstream providers and peers
- ❑ Or consider joining the INOC-DBA system
 - Voice over IP phone system using SIP
 - Runs over the Internet
 - www.pch.net/inoc-dba for more information

ISP Network Design



Summary

ISP Design Summary

- ❑ KEEP IT SIMPLE & STUPID ! (KISS)
- ❑ Simple is elegant is scalable
- ❑ Use Redundancy, Security, and Technology to make life easier for yourself
- ❑ Above all, ensure quality of service for your customers

ISP Network Design



ISP Workshops