

# Wireless Authentication

Network Startup Resource Center  
[www.nsrc.org](http://www.nsrc.org)



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# What is Authentication?

Definition:

- Authentication is the process of verifying the claim that an entity is allowed to act on behalf of a given known identity
- More simply:
  - Is this person says who they say they claim to be ?
  - Can they prove it (for example, with password, signature)?
  - In our case, the entity is the software, acting on behalf of the user controlling the computer.

# *Why do we make it so complicated?*

It is important to be aware of the differences:

- Just because I am on a certain computer, I am not necessarily its owner - the device is not the same as the person.
- Just because I am a certain person, I might not be in the right role to have access to a resource.

For example:

`user@private.place.net`

is not the same as

`user@at.work.com`

# Some core concepts, 1

It is important to distinguish between the following concepts:

- confidentiality
- access control
- authentication
- authorization

# Some core concepts, 2

- Confidentiality
  - Ensure that only those who should have access to information can indeed do so (usually encryption)
- Authorization & access control
  - Authorization defines what an entity (here, a user, a device) is authorized (allowed), to access or do
  - Which networks (ACLs/filters)
  - Which systems, which files ? (FS ACLs, permissions)
  - When can they do that (time policies) ?
  - Can they run an application or access a service ?
- Access control are the mechanisms by which these rights and restrictions are controlled and enforced

# What we are trying to solve

- Require authentication so that  
We know WHO, WHERE(\*), and WHEN
- This is NOT the same as using password based encryption (WPA2-PSK)
- Keys can be shared between users
  - No way to identify who has connected, where, and when
- We want to know:
  - Which user ?
  - What area of the wireless network (AP) did they associate with ?
  - When did they log on ?
  - What IP number did they have?

# Solutions

- There are two recommended ways to do this:
  - Captive portal
  - **802.1X (EAPoL and EAP-TLS) – preferred solution**
- Your choice depends on
  - The size of your organization
  - The maturity of your IT systems
    - You will need user stores, databases (e.g. AD/LDAP)
  - Your human resources
    - system admin, helpdesk, support
  - And many other factors

# Captive Portal, 1

- Plus
  - Popular (public areas, airports, hotels, ...)
  - Flexible
  - Self-explanatory (web page), can enforce AUP (Acceptable Use Policy) validation
  - Relatively easy to implement
- Minus
  - Not transparent
  - Depend on browser
  - Not standardized (different looks, different credentials, ...)
  - Requires regular re-authentication (disruptive)
  - Often unreliable and easy to break

# Captive Portal, 2

To "redirect" you to a welcome page, any one of the following methods may be used:

- HTTP silent redirection
- HTTP 30x redirect
- IP hijacking
- DNS hijacking
- Certain URLs may be allowed
  - e.g Information page, help page, use policies

# Captive Portal, 3


- Many vendors and open source projects
  - CoovaChilli, CoovaAP
  - WiFidog
  - M0n0wall, pfSense
  - zeroshell
- Many general networking vendors offer some form of integrated captive portals, e.g.
  - Mikrotik, HP, Cisco, Aruba, Atilo, Ubiquiti

# 802.1x/EAP

- Often called WPA2 Enterprise
- Originally designed for wired networks (EAPoL), but design accommodated for wireless networks
- RFC5216
- Layer 2 protocol
  - 4 states:
    1. initialization (all traffic blocked – no DHCP or anything)
    2. initiation (authenticator sends EAP-Requests, and client responds with EAP-Response-Identity)
    3. negotiation of a method of authentication
    4. authentication if negotiation succeeds

Traffic is allowed through

# 802.1x/EAP – How does it work



Source: Wikipedia

# 802.1x/EAP

- Plus
  - transparent for Applications
  - "inline" - doesn't require interaction with upper layers like DHCP, IP, HTTP to function
  - standardized for both wired and wireless LANs
- Minus
  - More challenging in deployment
  - requires an external authentication server (Radius)


# 802.1x & EAP vs captive portals, 1

- Captive portals may be preferable for networks, or parts of the network, where there are many non-regular, guest users
- Captive portals can guide users, provide helpdesk contact information
- 802.1x is more streamlined – and standardized – making it preferable for known users
- A combination of both may be useful
- 802.1x everywhere is possible, on LAN/WLAN (dedicated SSID)
- "Guest"-style captive portal for the rest (different SSID)
- Captive portal remains more intuitive for first time users and guests

# 802.1x & EAP vs captive portals, 2

- 802.1x is layer 2,  
Captive Portals use layers 3 - 7
- Both need authentication backends:
  - SQL or LDAP/Active Directory
  - Can be local flat text file (only advisable for small organizations, or as start/test)
  - Backends can be shared between technologies (captive portal + 802.1x)
- AAA server **Radius** - can use any of the above solutions)

# Central authentication backend on core network



# Security issues of 802.1x

802.1x or WPA2/EAP is the recommended authentication option, but it has a big security problem too:

- Its outer tunnel security relies on TTLS/SSL certificates
- These are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks – if the client device does not properly check the certificate, then it will give its credentials to ANY AP, e.g. rogue APs
- Its inner tunnel encryption is MSCHAP2, which is known to be broken/crackable

# Source and scope of the security problem

The problem is essentially a SSL/TTLS implementation problem

- Clients often do not even check CN (server name that the certificate belongs to), or they trust ANY certificate from a given root (CA)
- Nothing can protect us against client devices with bad certificate check implementations.
- Another part of the problem is the inner tunnel: MSCHAP2 is crackable.

# Addressing security issues of 802.1x

- We can enforce the best possible client configuration, for example by using the **eduroam CAT tool**, see <https://cat.eduroam.org>
- See also security recommendations on <https://wiki.geant.org/>



# Demonstration of man-in-the-middle attacks on 802.1x

- Get user to associate to rogue AP and start handshake,
- Authentication process
- Packet dump everything
- Analyze the traffic, isolate the handshake
- The outer tunnel is easy – as the attacker owns certificate and keys
- The inner tunnel (typically MSCHAP2) can be cracked (via offline or online services)



# NSRC recommendation for authentication

- User store in LDAP/AD, e.g. OpenLDAP
- RADIUS, e.g. freeradius
- Despite the security problems, **802.1x remains the best option** – with Captive Portal as a second option



# eduroam

- A recommended addition to your campus networks authentication is **eduroam**,

an international roaming service for users in research, higher education and further education.

Learn more at:



**eduroam**  
EDUCation ROAMing

<b>Purpose</b>	International authentication infrastructure
<b>Region served</b>	Worldwide
<b>Parent organization</b>	TERENA
<b>Website</b>	<a href="http://www.eduroam.org">www.eduroam.org</a>